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PEOPLE V. GmETH

(Crim. No. 4443.

In Bank.

[21 C.2d

Oct. 8, 1942.J

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LESLIE B. GIRETH,
Appellant.

l'

!

[1] Homicide-Appea1~Review...,..,-In a prosecution for murder by
defendant of his paramour, a judgment upon a plea of guilty
imposing the death penalty was affirmed where it was supported by defendanes voluntary statement to the authorities
shortly after his arrest and by his testimony before the grand
jury, and where an alienist testified as to his sanity.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County.
Lincoln S. Church, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder.
affirmed.

f

Judgment on plea of guilty

Leslie B. Gireth in pro. per., for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and David K. Lener, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
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THE COURT ...,....This is an automatic appeal from a judg"
ment 'of conviction of first-degree murder imposing the death
penalty on the defendarit. (See § 1239, Peri. Code.)
[1] Examination of therecol'd discloses that on July
16, 1942, the defendant, a married man, shot and killed a
young woman whom he hi1dbeen meeting clandestinely. The
victim was shot as she slept in a motor-court cabin shared
with the defendl'!-nt i:tt Alameda County. Defendant left the
the homicide and by telephone notified the authoriscene
ties of the' crime. 'He was taken into cUstOdy shortly thereafter and freely a.dmitted the shooting. Accordingly, he was
indicted for murder. At all times he has refused the assistance ,of counseL Upon his arraignment he pleaded guilty.
After hearing evidence addressed to the degree of 'the crime,

of

:~

i,~

[1] See 13 Cal.J'ur. 740.
:HeX. Dig. Reference: [1] Homicide, § 249.
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the court determined it to be of the first degree and imposed
the death penalty.
'
The voluntary statement of the defendant to the authori:'
ties shortly after his arrest and his testimony before the
grand jury when it was investigating the crime; support 'the
judgment. An alienist testified as to defendant'ssaniiy.,
The judgment is affirmed.

[So F. No. 16720. In Bank. Oct. 29, 1942.]

ROBERT FUENTES, Respondent,

v. LEE LING, Appellant.

Automobnes-Regulation-Pede~trian: Trafilc •..-Inasmuch as
, the Vehicle Code (§§ 458, 560-564) regulates pedestrian traffic
to the exclusion of local ordinances, an ordinance purporting
to regulate such traffic is invalid, and its violation does not
constitute negligence per se.
[2] Id.~Contributoi'y Negligence---Persons CrossingStreets-Between Crosswalks: Appeal-Conclusiveness of Findings-Persons Crossing Streets.-V chicle Code,' § 562, does riot prohibit a
pedestrian from. crossing a street outside of a crosswalk. And
a, finding against contributory negligence will not be disturbed
on appeal' where it appeared that a 'ped¢strian crossed a well
lighted business street in the middle of 11. block, arid prO:ceeded on, his way after ha'ving' observed an au:tonlobile aPproaching from a distance of 200 feet,with nothing to obstruct
his oi-the driver's view.
[3] Id.-Appeal---'Conclusivenessof Findings-Negligence of De. fendant.-In an action for injuries sustained bya pedestrian
struck by an automobile, a finding- ofnegligenCie of the dri'V'Ell'
will not be disturbcdon appeal wher'c,although'h,cstop~~
his car within five feet after thc,eollislon, ,the ,trial com:f;
might have concluded that he, Was negilgent in not' obserViD.g
the pedestrian on a well lighted street.
l ' "
,"
[4] Id,-Contributory Neg1igence..-Pe~sons on, Foo~i:~toxicati~i.
-Although a pedestrian struck by ,an automobile has taken
" intoxicants, it does not necessarily follow'that his judg!iieili;<ar
motor coordination is S,o affected as to make, him guiltY(;f
contributory negligence.
' ,
'" " ";

[1]

[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 29; 5 Am..Jur. 928. ,,',',', ,,','
McK. Dig. References: [1] AutOlDObill'l>, § 5; [2J Automobiles,
§§ 129,371(4); [31 Automobiles, § 369(·1); [4] AutoIUobUes, § 125.
'c,
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I. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. John J. Van Nostrand,
Judge. Affirmed.

Action for damages for injuries sustained by pedestrian
struak by an automobile. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
it!·:
i.!

Snook & Snook & Chase and Snook & Chase for Appellant.

l~

Leon A. Blum for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-This action was brought by plaintiff to
recover damages for personal injuries that he incurred when
struck by an automobile operated by defendant. The accident
occurred at about 7 o'clock on the evening of December 30,
1938, on Third Street between 'Kirkwood and LaSalle Avenues in San Francisco. Third Street, an arterial boulevard
extending north and south, is a main highway between San
Francisco and points south. It is. approximately eighty feet
.wide and is marked by white lines dividing six lanes of traffic.
Betw.een Kirkwood and. LaSalle Avenues, the frontage of
Third Str.eet is occupied by stores, apartments, flats, and a
'PUblic garage and constitutes a business district as that term
is used in traffic laws. When the accident Occurred it was a
clear night and the street was well lighted by street lights and
Christmas light streamers strung throughout tIre block. Plaintiff, clad .in a dark suit, was crossing Third Street at right
angles from east to west in the middle of the block when he was
lnu:lckeddown by the automobile that defendant was driving
south on the west side of Third Street in the second lane of
traffic. ~here is no pedestrian crosswalk in the middle of the
blOClr where plaintiff attempted to cross and where the accident· occurred. There are such crosswalks marked by white
lines at' the intersections of Third Street. Plaintiff testified
that he was more than halfway across the street when he first
saw defendant's car approaching from a distance of approximately 200 feet, aI;ld that he thought that he could cross in
safety before defendant's car travelod the distance of 200
feet or reached the middle of the block, although the car was
traveling at a "fast" spred. A traffic officer's report de. scribed plajntiff at the time of the accident as "under the
influence of intoxicants," and hospital records described
plaintiff as having a strong alcoholic breath, but plaintiff tes-

[21 C.2d 591

tified that he was not drunk and had taken no intoxicants ·tfu '
the day of thf.' accident. Defendant and :h.isson,who wall
riding- with him in the front seat, testified that they" did n.ot
sce plaintiff before the impact although they were both'observin~ the highway. They, as well as :other occupants '9:f'th~
automobile, estimated its speed as betWeen'18 iind',20',riiiieh
per hour. Witnesses for the plaintifftestiIledthAt itlieauto:tn9bile was traveling at a rate of 40 to 45
hour,. , D~
fendant brought his car to an almost imin'edia:tfstop '~ftei
the right front part of the car struck pl8intiff~,:Plainti~':~en
to the pavement with his head near the west curb and his'feet
under the running board of the car at about five feet norlh
of the car's front bumper. There were no skid marks QD ih~
pavement.
' "
:
After a trial without a jury, the court made findingS' in
favor of plaintiff and entered judgment for him .in the amount
of $4,373 and costs. Defendant has appeBledfromthe judg.
ment on the ground that plaintiff was guilty'of contributory
negligence as a matter of law and that the evidence was ,insufficient to support the findings and judgment.
[1] The contention that plaintiff wasguiity of contributory
negligence as a matter of law rests on' the Violation of se~.
tion 10 of article 3 of Ordinance 7691, NeW-Series, of San
Francisco, which provides:" When. within the' c'entral traffic
district or a husiness district no pedestrian shall cross' a
roadway other than by a crosswalk. "Phiintiff admittedly
violated .the ordinance. It has recently been held, however,
. that the Vehicle Code (§§ 458;. 560-564) . regulates the use
of public roadways by pedestrians to the exclusion of local
ordinances. (Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366 [125 P.2d 482J.
The San Francisco ordinance is indistinguishable from the Los
Angeles ordinance held invalid in the Pipoly case. It follows
therefore that plaintiff's violation of the ordinance did not constitute cuntributory negligence per se.
[2] Defendant contends that plaintiff's conduct was . also
a violation of the Vehicle Code and therefore constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law. Section 562 of the
Vehicle Code provides: "( a) Every pedestrian crossing a
roadway at any point other than within. a marked crosswalk
or ,,-ithin an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield
the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway." It does
not prohibit a pedestrian from crossing outside of a crosswalk,
however. (Genola v. Barnett, 14 Cal.~d 217 [93 P.2d 109].)

,miles per:
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Moreover the statute provides that "The prOVISIOns of this
section shall not relieve the driver of a vehicle from the duty
to exercise due care for the safety of any pedestrian upon a
roadway. " It cannot be said that as a matter of law a pedestrian who crosses a well lighted business street in the middle
of a block is guilty of violating the statute or of negligence
proximately contributing to his injury when he proceeds on
his way after having observed an automobile approaching
from a distance of 200 feet, with nothing to obstruct his view
or that of the driver. (See Quinn v. Rosenfeld, 15 Ca1.2d 486
[102 P.2d 317]; Genola v. Barnett, supra; Mitrovitch v.
Graves, 25 Cal.App.2d 649 [78 P.2d227] ; Varner v. Skov,
20 Cal.App.2d 232 [67 P.2d 123]; White v. Davis, 103
Cal.App. 531 [284 P. 1086].) Section 563 of the Vehicle
Code prohibits pedestrians from crossing except in a crosswalk between adjacent intersections where traffic is controlled
by a traffic control signal device or by police officers. There
is no evidence, nor is it contended that the traffic was so controlled at the intersections of Third Street and Kirkwood or
LaSalle Avenues.
The questions of negligence and contributory negligence
were for the trial court to determine (Quinn v. Rosenfeld,
supra; Genola v. Barnett, supra; Mitrovit,:h v. Graves, supra;
White v. Davis, supra), and its findings when supported by
the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. [3] The evidence as to the negligence of defendant was conflicting. The
ability of defendant to stop his automobile within five feet
after the collision suggests the improbability of excessive
speed, but even if the court accepted the defendant's version
in that regard it might have concluded that defendant was
negligent in not observing plaintiff on a well lighted street.
[4] The evidence as to plaintiff's intoxication was also conflicting, but even if the court believed that plaintiff had taken
intoxicants it does not necessarily follow that his judgment
or motor coordination were so affected as to make him guilty
of contributory negligence.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J.,
and Schauer, J. pro tem., concurred.
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E. E. JOHNSTON et al., Appellants, v. OLIVE LANDUCCI,
Respondent.
[1] Vendor and Purchaser -

Assignment - Rights Between .Purchaser and Assignee - Prohibition of Assignment Without
Consent.-In a contract for the sale of real property a prohibitionof an assignment of the rights of the vendee without the
consent of the vendor is for the benefit of the vendor only and
in no way affects the validity of an assignment without consent
as between the assignor and the assignee.

[2] Id.-Assignment--"Subject to Approval" of. Vendor-Construction.-Where a contract for the sale of real property
provides that an assignment thereof is "subject to the approval" of the vendor and also prohibits an assignment by
the vendee without the consent of the vendor, the words
"subject to the approval" are intended to. refer back to· the
provision against assignment and to call the· assignee's attention to the possible refusal of consent. Under this interpretation the "subject to approval" clause has the sameJegal effect
as the provision against assignment.
[3] Contracts'-Interpretation-Functions of Courts.-Where the
construction given an instrument by the trial court appears
to be consistent with the true intent of the parties· as shown
by the evidence, another interpretation will not he substituted
on appeal although such other interpretation might, witb,out
consideration of the evidence, seem equally tenable.
[4] Vendor and Purchaser-Assignment--Construction.-Although
a contract of sale of land prohibited an assignment without the
vendor's consent, and the vendee, without such consent, executed
an assignment "subject to the approval" of the vendor, a construction of the assignment as valid as between the vendee and
his assignee was consistent with their intent, where. the lawyer
preparing it testified that nothing was saini by either party
about sccuring the vendor's consent, where the assignor did not
agree to obtain the vendor's approval, and where immediately
upon the completion of the deal the assig~ee delivered to the
assignor his note and an assignment. of his interest in other
lands, and subsequently both parties treated the assignment
as a completed transaction.

[1] See 27 R.C.L. 564.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, §:218; [2,4]
Vendor and Purchaser, § 215; [3] Contracts, § 161; .[5J Contracts,

§ 150.

